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Pleasure in Atrocity
Ladelle McWhorter 
university of richmond
abstract: As Foucault says, genealogical work can be tedious and gray, but it is also 
pleasurable, even when the archives one delves into are filled with hatred, violence, and 
injustice. This article explores that pleasure, both its dangers and its possibilities, and 
in the process offers a partial genealogy of corporate personhood in U.S. legal history.
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On the morning of February 11, 2015, the lead editorial in the New York 
Times was entitled “Lynching as Racial Terrorism.” I took great pleasure 
in it.
I did not actually read the editorial. What gave me pleasure was the 
title, which affirmed the analytic and genealogical position I took on lynch-
ing in my last book: Lynching in the early twentieth century in this country, 
I argued, was a technique not of sovereign power (despite its resemblance 
to the spectacle of public execution in the ancien régime and elsewhere) 
but of disciplinary power; its exercise was decentralized, and its terrifying 
effects were felt in the bodies of entire populations who regulated their con-
duct accordingly—such is terrorism. Voilà, I felt the pleasure of intellectual 
affirmation. But there was another pleasure as well: recognition, the sort of 
pleasure you have when you come across a photograph of a place you once 
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went on vacation. Oh, yes, the lynching archive! I spent many happy hours 
there.
Genealogical work may look tedious and gray, but if it really were, why 
would anyone keep doing it? One of the hardest things about the work is 
extracting oneself from the archive in order to move on with the project. 
I spent many happy hours not only in archives on lynching but also in 
archives on yellow fever epidemics, sexual monomania, and case studies of 
children turned idiotic when horses kicked them in the head.
All of that was for my last book, which admittedly was about sexuality. 
But this sort of pleasure occurs in research on much less sexy topics as 
well. For my current book project, I have been reading a lot of history of 
economic theory and corporate law, and I find that there is just as much 
pleasure in that. In this essay, I will not attempt to account for all this plea-
sure, but I do want to sort through it a bit because there is in it, I think, both 
a danger and a possibility.
Reflecting on this pleasure, I realize that a big part of it is just what 
I will call the benign pleasure of assemblage. As a child, I spent many 
hours, months, and years immersed in processes of assemblage involving 
everything from Legos and Lincoln Logs to blocks of Styrofoam, wooden 
spools, Prince Albert cans, toothpicks, egg cartons, bits of Kleenex, and 
toilet paper dowels. I kept cigar boxes of interesting things—buttons, bottle 
caps, popsicle sticks, lone shoestrings—that I would eventually assemble 
into something—dollhouse furniture, a truck, a Christmas ornament. If 
I could not be a philosopher, I would want to be one of those people who 
build dioramas for history museums.
Assemblage is all-absorbing. There is no thought but connecting, 
pieces moving together and apart, the emerging properties of adhesives 
and edges and textures and hues. Connecting and connecting and connect-
ing and connecting. There is no knowing, only touching and joining and 
coming into view. Fascinating, fastening, unfastening, refastening, fash-
ioning, fascinating.
An archive is a cigar box.
One does not know this about archives prior to entry. One enters with 
an agenda. And here lurks the danger. I entered the archive of the history 
of corporate law against the background of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission (2010), which I view as a very bad Supreme Court decision that 
has enabled much evil and has delegitimized whatever claim the United 
States had to representative democracy. Now anyone with a corporate front, 
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even citizens of other countries, can pour millions of dollars into American 
elections, which we know means they can affect, if not wholly determine, 
the outcome of those elections. All of this because the U.S. Supreme Court 
holds that corporations are persons entitled to civil rights under the Consti-
tution through the Fourteenth Amendment. I entered the archive hoping 
to find a way to unthink corporate personhood, to cast the whole notion 
into question, to undermine it.
I knew, of course, that I would find nothing in the archive that could 
undo the Supreme Court’s decision or prevent Charles and David Koch 
and their cronies from spending $889 million to stack the next Congress, 
buy the next president, and indirectly appoint the next Supreme Court 
( Confessore 2015, A1). Against those forces—the present and future vic-
tors, as it were—I am impotent. But at least I could take a small share 
of “spiritual revenge” (Nietzsche 1993, essay 1, sec. 7). And I could take 
great pleasure in that. For, in the archive, I can call the shots. I can accuse, 
indict, prosecute, judge, and condemn—all from the comfort of my own 
carrel and my little bytes of cyberspace. My books, my photocopies, my 
Internet connection—all so many lovely “hiding places, secret paths and 
back doors,” my world, my security, my refreshment (Nietzsche 1993, essay 
1, sec. 10). I can play at politics, play at transformation; nothing will really 
change, but in my little nook I can forget all that. I can indulge in both 
fantastic violence and “self-narcosis” (Nietzsche 1993, essay 1, sec. 27). And 
anyone who has had back trouble or chronic anxiety or any kind of debili-
tating and persistent pain knows that there are few pleasures as pure as a 
deep, hard sleep: the archive as spiritual Tempur-Pedic.
All the better if one discovers truly embarrassing information about 
the current victors, if the record shows that corporate personhood entered 
American law as the result of an error or a lie—or both—which it did. Who 
does not love a story of scandalous birth?
For a long time in American law, corporations were what Chief Justice 
John Marshall and a unanimous Supreme Court said they were in 1809, “a 
mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal” (Blumberg 
1990, 54). Corporate “persons” were legal fictions, bearers of only those 
rights specifically granted to them at charter by the various states. They 
were referred to, legally, as “persons” only because, legally speaking, rights 
are only attributable to persons (a practice going back to ancient Roman 
law, which designated some collectives as persons and many people as 
nonpersons). If corporations were to have any rights at all, they needed 
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to become persons under the law over and above those individual people 
who owned shares in them. This was necessary not only to render busi-
ness transactions less cumbersome (imagine if every shareholder had to 
sign every contract!) but also to secure limited liability for those individual 
shareholders. No one supposed that corporations deserved rights because 
they were persons; they were declared persons only so that they could be 
granted rights.
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, when Chief Justice 
 Marshall made this assertion, there were barely more than three hundred 
corporations in the whole country. By today’s standards they were small. 
Most did only one kind of business, which was confined to one state. 
Although many were profit-seeking ventures, states chartered them (and 
gave shareholders limited liability) because they were believed to be contrib-
uting to some public good in addition to merely expanding the economy. 
This situation changed at mid-century with the coming of the railroads.
Railroads obviously contributed greatly to the public good. And build-
ing and running a railroad required a lot of capital, best raised by selling 
shares to many investors. For these reasons, it made good sense for states 
to charter them as corporations and to allow them to take land for tracks 
through eminent domain. But railroads also tended toward what some 
economists called a “natural monopoly”; the company that built the track 
more or less owned the route and could charge whatever it liked for fare 
or tonnage.1 States, seeking to maximize the railroads’ contribution to the 
public good, wanted to contain rail costs to citizens and other businesses. 
From very early on, then, states began to find themselves at odds with 
their own creatures, the corporate railroads. And railroads as corporations 
increasingly took on a less and less fictive life of their own.
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868, declaring that all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States are U.S. citizens, that no 
state can enforce any law abridging citizens’ privileges and immunities, 
“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.” In effect, the Fourteenth Amendment forced 
the states to recognize that the Bill of Rights protected everyone, including 
African Americans. Within the next two decades, railroad corporations took 
advantage of the legal ambiguity of the word person in the last two clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s section 1 and claimed for themselves the civil 
rights that Congress had sought to establish for former slaves.
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Many scholars have seen the decisive moment as 1886, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court heard the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad. The case concerned efforts by Santa Clara County, California, 
to collect property taxes from railroads. Under California law, individuals 
could deduct the value of a mortgage from the value of their property for tax 
purposes—paying tax only on the difference—but corporations were taxed 
on the entire value of the property regardless of an outstanding mortgage. 
Southern Pacific Railroad had refused to pay property taxes to the county 
for nearly two decades, contending among other things that discriminat-
ing between individual and corporate property-holders for the purpose of 
taxation was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and 
equal protection clauses. Lower court opinions did discuss the due process 
clause, but when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, it was decided 
on a basis other than the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, the 
Supreme Court rendered no opinion on the question of corporate person-
hood under the Constitution.
Two individuals, however, did. As the justices took their seats, before 
Justice Harlan delivered the majority opinion, Chief Justice Morrison 
Remick Waite reportedly turned to one of the attorneys and said, “The court 
does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 
applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.” Waite’s 
comment was not part of the official proceedings, and it may or may not 
have been true. But the court reporter, J. C. Bancroft Davis, inserted the 
comment into his headnote at the top of the opinion. Not only that, but 
he began the headnote thusly: “The defendant Corporations are persons 
within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Hartmann 
2010, 30–31). Headnotes are decidedly neither law nor the basis for legal 
precedent, yet Davis’s commentary has been cited as precedent for a num-
ber of important decisions in which corporate rights were expanded.2
Decisions in cases according corporations freedom of speech (now 
including freedom to use corporate money to “express” political prefer-
ences via campaign financing), freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure, freedom from double jeopardy, and most recently freedom of reli-
gious expression (for closely held corporations at least) hark back to that 
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headnote. In other words, they hark back to an error—or perhaps to a 
 deliberate attempt to confuse the issue and build a future case for  expansive 
corporate rights.
More than one legal historian has argued that the presumed “decision” 
in Santa Clara was not as far-reaching as most legal scholars have believed. 
The so-called entity theory of corporate personality had not yet been articu-
lated in 1886, at least not in print and certainly not in English; Marshall’s 
account of corporate existence as fictive still held sway. If the Court had 
actually decided that corporations were persons under the  Fourteenth 
 Amendment, it would have had to have meant, says Peter D’Errico (1996/7, 
103), that just as it is wrong to discriminate between black and white men, 
it is wrong to discriminate between natural and fictive, or artificial, persons 
and that the Fourteenth Amendment logically prohibits both. Morton Hor-
witz (1985–86) argues, to similar effect, that the entity theory—the idea 
that the corporation is a naturally arising agent that preexists “recognition” 
by charter—had no influence on American legal theory and practice until 
the very end of the nineteenth century. It was first proposed by the Ger-
man theorist Otto Gierke in his 1887 book, which was not translated into 
English until 1900 (and then only partially and in England by William Mai-
tland), and the first mention of Gierke’s ideas in the United States came in 
1897 in Ernst Freund’s The Legal Nature of the Corporation.
By the 1890s, American corporations were no longer few and small. 
They controlled an estimated three-quarters of the country’s wealth.3 They 
operated across state and even national lines. They were clamoring for lati-
tude in their charters to diversify their holdings. They were inventing new 
institutional forms—such as trust companies—to get around laws against 
holding shares in each other. And the petroleum industry, with Standard 
Oil and its financier J. P. Morgan at the forefront, was inventing vertical 
integration to maximize control over supply chains and thus over price. As 
President Cleveland had put it in his December 1888 State of the Union 
address, “Corporations, which really should be the carefully restrained 
creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the 
people’s masters” (Hartmann 2010, 25). By this time, it should be noted, 
major corporations included not only railroads but also the big steel cor-
porations that supplied tracks and huge insurance companies such as the 
Equitable, New York Life, and Mutual Life, which were heavily invested 
in mortgage-backed securities mainly drawn from the debt of western 
 farmers. In addition, Standard Oil was chartered in 1882 and was already 
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enormous and growing. These corporations were tremendously influential 
in the U.S. economy as well as in ordinary people’s lives. It no longer made 
sense to treat such entities as mere “fictions,” nor could it be held, as legal 
theorists had tried to do in previous decades, that corporations could be 
reduced to the persons of their shareholders. Corporations were real enti-
ties of some sort acting in the world both within and beyond the framework 
of traditional corporate law. The turn of the twentieth century saw a crisis 
in legal theory that paralleled the political crisis that produced antitrust law 
and the creation of the Federal Reserve. What were these things that were 
eating up wealth and manipulating the economy? They were not simply 
fictive rights-bearers; they were real actors. It was in this climate, Horwitz 
maintains, that courts and legislatures looked back at the Santa Clara deci-
sion and saw affirmation that corporations are indeed real persons under 
the law.4
The theoretical debate over corporate nature raged for more than 
a quarter century, and the courts were somewhat erratic in their deci-
sions, but the long-term trend was toward granting corporations more 
and more civil rights while giving states less and less authority to dictate 
the terms of their existence. This process did result in some setbacks for 
 corporate interests, such as the unprecedented application of criminal law 
to  corporations; in addition to their officers, corporations themselves can 
be convicted of crimes and punished for them. (The theoretical debate over 
mens rea is especially delightful!) But on the whole, corporations gained 
many more legal rights than legal liabilities.
All of this was set in motion—though the outcome was not 
 determined—by Chief Justice Waite and court reporter Davis. Was that 
happenstance? Or was something more intentional going on? The sto-
ries the archives tell are fascinating, full of intrigue, greed, corruption, 
perjury, and fraud. There were congressional hearings revealing, sup-
posedly, that the framers of the bill that became the Fourteenth Amend-
ment intended to cover corporations all along (justifying the courts’ 
decisions under the interpretive doctrine of original intent), but subse-
quent evidence (posthearings) showed that the testimony presented was 
falsified. Over the decades historians have put forth conspiracy theories 
involving Davis, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, Senator Roscoe 
 Conkling and Congressman John Bingham (members of the commit-
tee that drafted the amendment), and even President Ulysses S. Grant 
(whose own party refused to nominate him for a second term because of 
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his close  association with the railroads).5 Whether the result of conspiracy 
or merely repeated opportunism, however, corporate personhood as it 
now exists is of highly dubious origins, issuing forth not from legislation 
enacted by duly selected representatives but via judges, attorneys, clerks, 
and the editors of  American law reviews, many of whom had huge stakes 
in corporate power and profit. The origins of modern corporate person-
hood are dripping with the slime of a miscarriage of justice. And it gives 
me great pleasure to know so and to proclaim so.
There is great pleasure to be had in evil, or at least in discovering and 
exposing past evil to explain much of the very unpleasant evil I experience 
today—such as a recent run-in with a credit card company that is charging 
us a $111 late fee because, although our check likely arrived at their offices 
three days before it was due, they require up to ten business days for pro-
cessing, a fact they do not bother to share with their customers under rou-
tine circumstances. Thus they incentivize electronic payment, giving them 
direct access to their customers’ bank accounts. This infuriates me. I will 
nail them to the genealogical wall. Sweet spiritual revenge!
How different, really, is this pleasure of mine from the pleasure 
 Tertullian takes in describing his vision of the day of judgment when Chris-
tians will be able to “see so many illustrious monarchs . . . groaning now in 
the lowest darkness . . . ; governors of provinces, too, who persecuted the 
Christian name, in fires more fierce than those with which in the days of 
their pride they raged against the followers of Christ” (in Nietzsche 1993, 
essay 1, sec. 15)?6 Is it different at all? These are the fantastic pleasures of 
the vulgar and sick, the pleasures of slaves.
They are also, of course, creative pleasures. Tertullian’s pleasure 
fathered a church. A genealogist’s pleasure can birth a counterhistory. 
There is no point in defending myself against the charge of pettiness. I am 
petty, small, a product of a slave revolt in morality. I cannot command the 
world or even my little nook of it. Hence, I cannot afford to be fastidious. 
I must take my pleasure where I can. And so I spin stories from fragments 
I dig up in archives. I love telling stories.
This pleasure is dangerous in a variety of ways, but I will mention only 
one, which is that it may intensify my pettiness and close off any transfor-
mation, any creativity, beyond its own enactment. Giving the reins to my 
vengeance like this could trap me forever inside my slavish little self. That 
would not be a tragedy—after all, nothing that happens to a little self is—
but it might be sad, a waste of whatever tiny bit of vitality I have.
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But I have also asserted that this pleasure holds out a possibility; indeed, 
genealogy always holds out a possibility that a new story will take hold and 
shape more than the genealogist’s fantasies, that it may be transformative, 
that it may have its own material effects. And in this particular case—my 
spiritual revenge against corporate persons—the possibility looks unusu-
ally promising. In fact, a large part of the pleasure I take in this work comes 
from this looming possibility; I take pleasure in the uncertain process of 
possible actualization.
The archive changed my mind. Yes indeed, I came to believe, corpora-
tions are persons! John Dewey was right! A person is just whatever the law 
designates as a person, and that is as true of us “natural” persons as it is 
of those formerly “fictive” ones (Dewey 1926, 657). What is the difference, 
really?
Well, there are big differences, obviously, between me and IBM, but 
consider: Some persons are male and others are female; some are for-profit 
and others are not-for-profit; some employ ten other persons and others 
employ ten thousand; some have the right to vote and marry and others 
do not. There are perhaps as many differences among human persons 
and among corporate persons as there are between the two categories. The 
point is that all persons are individuated agential entities bearing rights 
and responsibilities, both legal and (many would argue) moral. Instead 
of decrying corporate personhood, what we need to do, as Dewey pointed 
out in 1926, is study “the change which took place in the eighteenth and 
 nineteenth centuries in the concept of the ‘singular person,’ now become 
the full-fledged individual in his own right” (1926, 668). The genealogical 
target should be personhood per se.
For more than three centuries, since John Locke published the second 
edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1694, personhood 
has been bound to juridical concerns—both human and divine. People 
must be judgeable. Their conduct must be pinned to them as actions, dis-
crete actions of individuated actors who can be called to account. A per-
son is always the correlate of a judge, actual or potential, reflexive or alter, 
human or divine. A person is a free and responsible agent, responsible 
because free, free because responsible. A person is neither a soul nor a 
body, although it may be correlated with entities of these sorts. It is an 
agent aware of its actions over time.
This concept of person, with variations over the centuries, under-
writes vast configurations of power in contemporary society, including the 
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 neoliberal configurations that structure many international relations and 
the global economy. In the name of this person’s freedom, militaries 
have been mobilized, national assets have been privatized, environmen-
tal regulations have been relaxed, and labor unions have been broken and 
destroyed. In the name of this person’s responsibility, social services have 
been gutted, pension funds have been decimated, consumer protections 
have been eliminated, and communal bonds have been weakened and 
destroyed. There is no such thing as society, neoliberal Margaret Thatcher 
proclaimed; there are only individuals. There is no such thing as a collec-
tive, only aggregates. There is no such thing as solidarity, only individual 
interest and personal loss and gain.
Except—there are corporations. And try as they might to give an 
account of corporations as unitary agents or as aggregates of unitary 
agents, the theorists have failed. Corporate personhood—corporate 
agency and awareness through time, which does exist—is very clearly a 
historically emergent effect of a network of forces. And this is a good 
departure point for a new story, a site where a genealogist might begin to 
assemble a counterhistory of this neoliberal world we live in now. Indeed, 
corporate personhood may well be one of the most useful of archival facts 
for the assemblage of a very different account of human agency and self-
hood; it holds out the genealogical promise of self-transformation of the 
most literal sort.
For as long as I can remember I have found the experience of a new 
idea to be pleasurable. It does not matter what the idea is; its newness, 
along with its coherence with other ideas already held, is pleasant in and 
of itself. This is the pleasure of unperturbed surprise: Oh, that was not in 
view before! And the pleasure of jigsaw puzzle solving: Oh, this fits here! 
This particular new idea—that corporate personhood may be the key to 
undermining modern selfhood—brings pleasure in its specificity, however, 
in great part because of its glaring perversity. Would it not be funny/ironic 
if the very engine of neoliberalism’s take-over turned out to be one key to 
its conceptual and perhaps literal undoing?
Finally, though, there is the pleasure of possibility itself, the possibility 
that things really might become otherwise, that the world is underdeter-
mined, that there is a future that no force dictates and no thinker knows. 
Ultimately, I think, one of the greatest pleasures in life is the experience of 
ignorance in the face of the future: the pleasure of the abyss, also known 
as freedom.
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notes
1. There were cases of parallel tracks and companies in competition with 
each other, but the inefficiency was not conducive to low costs to consumers 
either. J. P. Morgan stepped in to eliminate this inefficiency near the end of the 
nineteenth century.
2. See Horwitz 1985–86 for discussion of Santa Clara as precedent. Horwitz 
does not comment on the fact that the relevant assertion appeared only in a 
headnote. For a discussion of that, see Hartmann 2010, chap. 3.
3. Horwitz (1985–86, 180) cites Justice Stephen Field on this point. Field was a 
contemporary proponent of corporate rights, so the estimate might be inflated.
4. For a very detailed and interesting account of the rise of U.S. Steel and 
International Harvester and the way finance capitalists handled the Panic of 1907, 
see Levy 2012, chap. 8.
5. Hartmann covers the main conspiracy theories in chap. 1 of his 2010 book.
6. Nietzsche quotes this and much more from Tertullian.
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